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ARISTOTLE IN HELL AND AQUINAS IN HEAVEN: 
HUGO DE NOVOCASTRO, OFM  
AND DURANDUS DE AURELIACO, OP  
For the history of Aristotelianism, the question “Utrum Aristoteles sit sal-
vatus” has long played an exemplary role. Since Martin Grabmann first 
drew attention to the question, its consignment of the Philosopher to eternal 
flames has represented one end of the spectrum of judgments on Aristotle, 
the counterweight to Dante’s situating him in Limbo and Lambert de Mon-
te’s argument for his salvation.1 It has also served as the representative of a 
silent majority, to the point of being called even “a genre of quodlibetal 
questions” in which, confronted with the question of Aristotle’s salvation, 
“most conservative theologians packed him off to hell.”2 
Two major factors have limited the ability of historians to gauge the 
impact of this question: it is isolated and anonymous. It exists in a single 
manuscript, Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 1012, as one of the 
final questions in a miscellany containing predominantly Franciscan ques-
tions mostly from the 1310s and 20s, some of them from written quodli-
beta. The question lacks any ascription of author, and so its appearance in 
the codex means that it might be a quodlibetal determination, and it proba-
bly is by a Franciscan.3 
                                                 
1M. GRABMANN, “Aristoteles im Werturteil des Mittelalters”, in Mittelalterliches Geistes-
leben: Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik 3, München 1936, 63-102; 
A.-H. CHROUST, “A Contribution to the Medieval Discussion: ‘Utrum Aristoteles Sit Sal-
vatus’”, in Journal of the History of Ideas 6 (1945), 231-38; R. IMBACH, “Aristoteles in der 
Hölle. Eine anonyme Questio ‘Utrum Aristotiles sit salvatus’ im Cod. Vat. Lat. 1012 (127ra-
127va) zum Jenseitsschicksal des Stagiriten”, in Peregrina Curiositas: Eine Reise durch den 
orbis antiquus, hrsg. v. A. KESSLER, T. RICKLIN und G. WURST, Freiburg (Schweiz) 1994, 
297-318 (containing the edition); IDEM, “De salute Aristotilis. Fussnote zu einem scheinbar 
nebensächlichen Thema”, in Contemplata aliis tradere. Studien zum Verhältnis von Literatur 
und Spiritualität, hrsg. v. C. BRINKER, U. HERZOG, N. LARGIER und P. MICHEL, Bern 1995, 
157-73; S. NEGRI, “La quaestio «De salvatione Aristotelis» del tomista Lamberto di Monte”, 
in L’antichità classica nel pensiero medievale, a cura di A. PALAZZO, Porto 2011, 413-40; 
Peter VON MOOS, Heiden im Himmel? Geschichte einer Aporie zwischen Mittelalter und 
Früher Neuzeit, Heidelberg 2014. 
2 K. ROBERTSON, “Abusing Aristotle”, in Speculative Medievalisms: Discography, ed. E. JOY, 
A. KŁOSOWSKA, N. MASCIANDARO and M. O’ROURKE, Brooklyn, NY 2013, 159-72, here 161. 
3 On Cod. Vat. lat. 1012, see W.O. DUBA, “Continental Franciscan Quodlibeta after Scotus”, 
in Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, ed. C. SCHABEL 
(Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 7), Leiden-Boston 2007, 569-649, here 640-49. 
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While working on a study of the eternity of the world in fourteenth-
century Franciscan thought, I found strong parallels between the Franciscan 
theologian Hugh of Neufchâteau’s (Hugo de Novocastro) commentary on the 
Sentences, likely deriving from lectures given at Paris in the first half of the 
1310s, and the question on Aristotle’s fate.4 Specifically, two of the three 
arguments in the question find parallels in Hugh of Neufchâteau’s commen-
tary on Book II d.1 of the Sentences q.4, “Utrum aeternitas mundi secundum 
quod eam ponit Aristoteles possit demonstrari esse impossibilis,”5 and the 
damning conclusion corresponds, in part word-for-word, to a passage in the 
commentary. In the question on the salvation of Aristotle, the author makes 
three claims: first, that Christian beatitude cannot be known from pure natu-
ral capacities alone; second, that the Secreta secretorum and the Liber de 
pomo, which imply Aristotle’s salvation, are not authentic works;6 third, that 
Aristotle’s philosophy is incompatible with Christian beatitude, and that, if 
he had some revelation that made his salvation possible, we would at least 
have heard about his change of mind. The first claim matches Hugh of Neuf-
château’s thesis in q.4: natural reason is insufficient to demonstrate the eter-
nity or temporal creation of the world. Although Hugh’s question in the Sen-
tences does not discuss the authority of the Liber de pomo or the Secreta 
secretorum, its presentation of Aristotle’s doctrine of the soul matches that 
used in support of the third claim in the anonymous question on salvation. 
Specifically, the third claim holds that Aristotle’s teaching about the soul is 
incompatible with Christian belief; because, on the one hand, Aristotle posit-
ed an eternal world, and, on the other, that an actual infinite cannot exist, he 
had either to posit that there is only one, incorruptible soul for all humanity 
or that the soul is corrupted with the body, but what he actually held is in 
doubt.7 Similarly, Hugh concludes that what Aristotle actually said about 
                                                 
4 On Hugh of Neufchâteau, see W.J. COURTENAY, “Early Scotists at Paris: A Reconsidera-
tion”, in Franciscan Studies 69 (2011), 175-225, at 207-9. 
5 In what follows, I use the copies contained in Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, 
Cod. Conv. Soppr. A.3.641, ff. 7va-9ra (=J); Tortosa, Archivio Capitular, Cód. 201, ff. 8va-
10rb (=T), checked against Paris, BnF, Ms. lat. 15856, ff. 22ra-23rb (=Y), which presents an 
earlier redaction of the question. 
6 This particular aspect is analyzed in S.J. WILLIAMS, The Secret of Secrets: The Scholarly 
Career of a Pseudo-Aristotelian Text in the Latin Middle Ages, Ann Arbor, MI 2003, 276-79. 
7 “Utrum Aristotelis sit salvatus”, ed. in IMBACH, “Aristoteles in der Hölle”, 309. This 
analysis of Aristotle’s true doctrine of the soul has precedents in HENRICUS OF GANDAVO, 
Quodlibet IX q. 14, and BONAVENTURA (A BAGNOREA), In II Sent. d.1 pars 1 q.2; for Henry, 
see K. EMERY, Jr., “The Image of God, Deep in the Mind: the Continuity of Cognition ac-
cording to Henry of Ghent”, in Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie 
an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte, 
hrsg. v. J.A. AERTSEN, K. EMERY, Jr. und A. SPEER (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), Berlin 
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human souls is uncertain, and many think that Aristotle would hold “the 
opinion of the Commentator” (that a single intellect is eternal); for his part, 
Hugh believes that “the intellect by which we formally understand is not an 
incorruptible form.”8 
Finally, the conclusion of the question on salvation, in which the author 
places Aristotle in Hell, has verbatim parallels with Hugh’s refutation of 
the preliminary argument that Aristotle did not believe that he had demon-
strated the eternity of the world. Both texts use the same passage from Au-
gustine to put Aristotle in Hell, making the same adjustments to: 
Augustinus exponens illud Psalmi Absorpti sunt iuncti petre iudices 
eorum, videtur expresse dicere quod ipse est dampnatus in inferno, ubi 
comparatur Petrae, id est Christus, contremiscit.9 
Finally, both texts make the same observation, practically word-for-word, 
on the need for circumspection when discussing the truths of faith: 
“Utrum Aristoteles sit salvatus” (ed. 
in IMBACH, “Aristoteles in der Hölle”, 
309-10) 
HUGO DE NOVOCASTRO, In II Sent. d.1 q.4 (J, 
ff. 8vb-9ra; T, f. 10rb) 
Unde quantumcumque claruerit gra-
tiis gratis datis sive donis naturali-
bus, hoc non iuvat, quia in hiis, quo-
rum veritas non potest sciri nisi ex reve-
latione, nimis adhesit superbe apparentie 
sue rationis. Unde in talibus, quorum fi-
des dicit oppositum cogitare debuit, quod 
nihil prohibet, et maxime in talibus, que  
Ipse enim fuit homo et deficere potuit, 
etiam fecit in hiis quae ratione humana 
investigari possunt. In hiis autem quorum 
veritas sciri non potest nisi ex revelatione, 
defecit nimis [J 9ra] superbe adhaerens appa-
rentiae suae rationis. Scivit enim, et <in> tali-
bus quorum fides dicit oppositum, cogitare 
debuit, quod nihil prohibet, et maxime in tali- 
                                                 
2001, 59-124, at 95-98; for Bonaventure see R.C. DALES, Medieval Discussions of the Eter-
nity of the World, Leiden 1990, 94. 
8 HUGO DE NOVOCASTRO, In II Sent. d.1 q.4 (J, f. 8rb; T, f. 9va): “Ad tertiam rationem de 
animabus dicitur quod nescitur determinate quid diceret. Videtur enim multis quod ipse 
teneret opinionem Commentatoris, sed mihi hoc non videtur possibile, cum evidenter inclu-
dat contradictoria ut ostendetur infra. Credo ergo omnibus praetermissis quod secundum sua 
principia ipse diceret quod intellectus quo intelligimus formaliter non est forma incorruptibi-
lis, licet continuationem habeat cum intelligentia aliqua incorruptibili.” 
9 “Utrum Aristotelis sit salvatus”, ed. in IMBACH, “Aristoteles in der Hölle”, 309-10; 
HUGO DE NOVOCASTRO, In II Sent. d.1 q.4 (J, f. 9ra; T, f. 10rb). Cf. AUGUSTINUS 
HIPPONENSIS, Enarrationes in Psalmos: CI-CL (CCSL 40), on Ps. 140, 2040: “Quid faciunt 
pauci aliter disputantes? Iudices sunt impiorum. Sed quid ad te? Vide quid sequitur: absorpti 
sunt iuxta petram iudices eorum. Quid est: absorpti sunt iuxta petram? Petra autem erat 
Christus. Absorpti sunt iuxta petram. Iuxta, id est, comparati iudices, magni, potentes, docti; 
ipsi dicuntur iudices eorum, tamquam iudicantes de moribus et sententiam proferentes. Dixit 
hoc Aristoteles. Adiunge illum petrae, et absorptus est. Quis est Aristoteles? Audiat: dixit 
Christus, et apud inferos contremiscit.” 
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remote sunt a sensibus, falsa esse proba-
biliora veris et talia excedere mentem ho-
minis. Et per consequens de talibus nihil 
proterve nec superbe debuit assere. 
bus quae remota sunt a sensibus, quaedam falsa 
esse probabiliora quibusdam veris et talia exce-
dere mentem hominis, et per consequens in tali-
bus nihil proterve nec superbe debuit asserere. 
The question “Utrum Aristoteles sit salvatus” should therefore be ascribed 
to Hugh of Neufchâteau. Moreover, Hugh’s commentary on the Sentences 
repeats the same claims about Aristotle’s salvation, and unlike his question, 
the commentary survives in numerous copies across Europe, and had an 
influence on medieval thought that, if not known, is at least capable of in-
vestigation. 
Inevidentiae contra Durandum de Aureliaco  
As the question “Utrum Aristoteles sit salvatus” for Aristotelianism, so the 
Evidentiae contra Durandum has served as a landmark for Thomism. Isabel 
Iribarren has underscored that the author of the Evidentiae used the text of 
Thomas to criticize Durand rather than defend the ideas of Thomas against 
criticism, which marks a development in the history of Thomism: 
Whereas Hervaeus’ Thomism showed the resilience of times of controver-
sy, the Thomist elements in the Evidentiae are presented in a way more 
suitable for commentary than interpretation. Durandellus makes a norma-
tive use of the Thomist corpus, as he adduces quotations from Aquinas’ 
works for the sake of proof in his arguments against Durand. The value of 
the Evidentiae thus resides in its being probably the first example we pos-
sess of Aquinas’ writings being treated as a locus theologicus, as obliged 
theological reference.10 
When Joseph Koch studied the Evidentiae in 1927, its author, known as 
‘Durandellus’, was generally assumed to be the Dominican theologian Du-
rand of Aurillac: 
The usual view is that Durandus de Aureliaco is Durandellus. Since he 
read the Sentences in 1330-31 and in [1334] as a Master of Theology par-
ticipated in the controversy over the beatific vision, the fact that Thomas 
in the Evidentiae is called sanctus poses no problems regarding his author-
ship. Accordingly, the younger Durandus could very well be the author of 
the Evidentiae. In addition, this is supported by the fact that in Cod. 198 of 
the library of the University of Paris, on f. 150r, one reads: Incipit prohe-
mium Durandi. Therefore, the question needs closer examination.11  
                                                 
10 I. IRIBARREN, “Thomism”, in Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy be-
tween 500 and 1500, ed. H. LAGERLUND, Dordrecht 2011, 1302-8, at 1305-6. 
11 J. KOCH, Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin 
zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 
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Koch diligently studied the only surviving written work positively ascribed 
to Durand of Aurillac, the question “Utrum tempus sit aliquid reale extra 
animam,” preserved in a single manuscript copy, El Escorial, Biblioteca del 
Real Monasterio de San Lorenzo, Cód. lat. R.II.4, ff. 145va-147vb. On this 
basis, Koch rejected the identification of Durand of Aurillac with Durandellus. 
To find the author, Koch first determined that the author wrote after Thomas’ 
canonization in 1325 and, at least at the time of writing, was not a master of 
theology. He then followed his hunches: several early copies of Durandellus 
came from Italy, and a thematic resonance suggested someone from the circle 
of John of Naples. In two manuscripts, Koch found an attribution to a certain 
Nicolaus, although in one case, this attribution is based on a misreading.12 The 
other manuscript is in Naples, and begins: “Incipiunt soluciones, responsiones 
et reprobaciones racionum et opposicionum domini Durandi, que fecit contra 
sanctum Thomam, fratris Nicolai Medensis.”13 Koch therefore proposed a 
certain Nicholas of S. Vittore, a Dominican who attended the 1344 General 
Chapter of Le Puy as the definitor of the province of the Kingdom of Sicily. 
Koch concludes: “In any case, one should follow this trail further, starting with 
a more precise investigation into Ms. VII C 51 in Naples. Only archival re-
search in situ can cast light on the question.”14 
Following Koch’s lead, the editor of the Evidentiae, P.T. Stella, suggested 
that this Nicholas could come from a house of Benedictine women named S. 
Vittore in the town of Meda near Milan.15 Further, he judged that the Naples 
manuscript was a fragmentary and contaminated witness of the Evidentiae.16 
While I have not yet had the opportunity to examine the Naples manu-
                                                 
26), Münster i.W. 1927, 359-60: “Die gewöhnliche Ansicht geht dahin, daß Durandus de 
Aureliaco = Durandellus ist. Da er 1330/31 die Sentenzen gelesen und 1332 als Magister am 
Streit um die visio beatifica teilgenommen hat, so macht bei ihm der Umstand, daß Thomas 
in den evidentiae als sanctus bezeichnet wird, keine Schwierigkeiten. Außerdem spricht 
viels dafür, daß die evidentiae um 1330 entstanden sind. Demnach könnte der jüngere 
Durandus recht wohl der Verfasser der evidentiae sein. Hinzu kommt, daß in Cod. 198 der 
Pariser Universitätsbibliothek f. 150r zu lesen ist: Incipit prohemium Durandi. Die Frage 
bedarf also genauer Prüfung.” 
12 A. MAIER, “Zur Textüberlieferung einiger Gutachten des Johannes de Neapoli”, in Aus-
gehendes Mittelalter. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistegeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts, 
Roma 1977, 481-504, here 504. 
13 NICOLAI MEDENSIS (DURANDELLI) Evidentiae contra Durandum, 2 vols., ed. P.T. 
STELLA, Tübingen 2003, in vol. 1, 62*; cf. KOCH, Durandus de S. Porciano O.P., 368, who 
reads quas facit instead of Stella’s que fecit. 
14 KOCH, Durandus de S. Porciano O.P.,365-69. 
15 DURANDELLUS, Evidentiae 1, ed. STELLA, 21*. 
16 DURANDELLUS, Evidentiae 1, ed. STELLA, 191*. 
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script, I can put forth a better case for the identity of Durandellus without 
besmirching the honor of the nuns of S. Vittore: Durand of Aurillac. 
Koch’s refutation of the identity between Durand of Aurillac and Durandel-
lus is in itself insufficient. Moreover, the close textual parallels between the 
question on time used by Koch and Walter Burley’s commentary on the 
Physics show that Durand of Aurillac’s question either derives from some 
version of Burley’s commentary, or that both come from an earlier source. 
Finally, Durand of Aurillac’s Franciscan contemporary, William of 
Brienne, explicitly and implicitly criticizes him in a way that evokes paral-
lels with Durandellus’ doctrine. 
Koch makes three arguments to dissociate Durandellus from Durand of 
Aurillac on the basis of the latter’s question on time. First, in this question, 
Durand of Aurillac criticizes Peter Auriol, Robert Grosseteste and even 
Hervaeus Natalis, but he does not mention Durand of Saint-Pourçain’s 
unique view, which Durandellus ought to have done. Second, this question 
shows a great interest for what Koch calls “mathematical-physical ques-
tions (tempus, motus, continuum, etc.),” for which Durandellus seems to 
have little interest in his Evidentiae. Finally, Koch identifies a doctrinal 
contradiction. In his question on time, Durand of Aurillac states that there 
is nothing intrinsic in every motion such that ‘being-caused-by-the-
heavens’ pertains to its essence (“unus enim motus non est de essencia 
alterius”). Rather, this causality is due to the current order of the universe. 
On the other hand, Durandellus, concerning the punishment of the damned, 
argues that “what is prior by nature and as a cause is not prior in a certain 
respect, say according to the present order, but without restriction.” Durand 
of Aurillac seems to say that being caused is extrinsic to what a thing is, 
while Durandellus holds that a prior, causal motion is included in every 
terrestrial motion. 17 
Neither of the first two arguments, based on negative evidence, suffices 
to establish real non-identity. Only the third argument seems strong. Du-
randellus, as will be discussed below, famously holds that a relation has no 
reality outside of its foundation and term; on this assumption, then, a rela-
tion of causality would have no reality outside of its terms, and being prior 
by nature would be identical with (and rationally distinct from) the cause, 
the heavens, and extrinsic to the caused, terrestrial motion. Thus the appar-
ent contradiction disappears. 
Durand of Aurillac’s question on time, moreover, shows a strong associa-
tion with Walter Burley’s commentary on the Physics, to the point that it ap-
                                                 
17 KOCH, Durandus de S. Porciano O.P., 363-64. 
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pears to be a paraphrase of his Questions on the Physics IV tr.3 cc.1-2. Du-
randֺ’s question follows the structure of Burley’s commentary, and at times 
carries verbatim the same text, such as the discussion of the senses of time: 
GUALTERUS BURLAEUS, In IV Physicorum tr.3 c.2 
(Venezia 1501, f. 131vb; Venezia 1589, col. 536)  
DURANDUS DE AURELIACO, Quaestio de 
tempore, El Escorial, Biblioteca del 
Real Monasterio de San Lorenzo, Cód. 
lat. R.II.4, f. 146ra 
Maxime vero proprie accipitur tempus pro dura-
tione primi mobilis, quia motus primi mobilis est 
primus inter omnes motus et maxime uniformis. 
Et ille sunt condiciones essentiales motus quem 
tempus primo consequitur. Motus etiam primi 
mobilis est velocissimus, et ideo maxime habet 
rationem mensure, quoniam illa duratio primi 
mobilis est primum tempus, sicut motus primi 
mobilis est primus inter omnes motus. 
Quinto, maxime proprie accipitur pro 
duracione motus primi mobilis, qui est 
primus inter omnes et maxime unifor-
mis. Et iste sunt condiciones essenti-
ales motus quem tempus consequitur. Et 
ille motus est velocissimus. Unde dura-
tio successiva istius motus vere et pro-
prie dicitur tempus. 
The “contradictory” passage that Koch identified parallels Burley so-
mewhat more freely: 
GUALTERUS BURLAEUS, In IV Physicorum tr.3 c.2 
(Venezia 1501, f. 132va-vb; Venezia 1589, col. 
539) 
DURANDUS DE AURELIACO, Quaestio de 
tempore, El Escorial, Biblioteca del 
Real Monasterio de San Lorenzo, Cód. 
lat. R.II.4, f. 146va 
Et, si dicitur quod Commentator dicit quod, si 
celum staret, nos non essemus in esse trans-
mutabili, quod tamen non sequitur, si stante celo, 
posset esse aliquis alius motus, unde secundum 
Commentatorem sequitur: ‘non est motus celi, 
ergo nullus alius motus’, 
Ad istam respondet Commentator IV 
Physicorum quod, posito quod primum 
mobile staret, pariter (scripsit Koch) 
omnis alius motus, et per consequens 
non esset aliquo modo tempus. 
dicendum quod non sequitur per consequentiam 
tenentem per locum intrinsecum ‘motus celi non 
est, ergo nullus alius motus est’, sicut etiam non 
sequitur econverso per locum intrinsecum ‘alius 
motus est a motu celi, ergo motus celi est et ita ad 
illam celum stat’. Non sequitur quod nullus mo-
tus est tanquam aliquid quod est de intellectu 
antecedentis. 
Sed quia consequentia sua non tenet ab 
intrinseco – unus enim motus non est de 
essentia alterius quin uno existente, ali-
us possit non esse –  
Attamen sequitur per locum extrinsecum, non 
sequitur ratione ordinis naturalis universi, quo-
niam secundum ordinem naturalem universi qui-
libet alius motus dependet in esse a primo motu. 
sed tenet ab extrinseco, considerato or- 
dine universi qui nunc est, ideo dicendo 
aliter, scilicet quod, cessante motu pri-
mi mobilis, et remanente motu alterius 
mobilis, non esset tempus propriissime 
dictum; esset tamen aliud tempus quod 
esset duratio illius motus. 
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While the exact connection between the Quaestio de tempore and the va-
rious redactions of Burley’s work needs further analysis, the link suffices to 
explain (against Koch) why Durand of Aurillac appears so interested in the 
physical part of the topic, and not the metaphysical aspects, and why he does 
not mention Durand of Saint-Pourçain: his source is a Physics commentary 
that does not mention Durand either. Like Durandellus in the Evidentiae, 
Durand of Aurillac here applies a text in front of him to resolve a problem. 
Finally, Durand of Aurillac’s Franciscan contemporary who read the 
Sentences at Paris in the same academic year (1330-31), William of 
Brienne, explicitly associates with his adversaries doctrines characteristic 
of Durandellus. Specifically, two studies of Durandellus published in 1997 
identify two points at which Durandellus’ doctrine in the Evidentiae breaks 
with the teaching of Thomas. First, Gilles Emery shows that Durandellus 
repeatedly insists that a relation has no reality apart from those of its foun-
dation and its term, and that a relation is distinguished from its foundation 
only by reason.18 Second, Henry Donneaud accuses Durandellus of a seri-
ous confusion in epistemology when he departs from Thomas’ teaching on 
faith; in particular, while Thomas denies that one can have faith and scien-
tific knowledge of the same conclusion, since faith is based on the conclu-
sion’s inevidence and knowledge on its evidence, he does allow that one 
can both believe and know a given conclusion. Durandellus also denies that 
properly speaking faith and scientific knowledge can be had of the same 
object, but, according to Donneaud, he mixes up the medium that causes 
assent (demonstration in scientific knowledge and authority in faith) with 
the (in)evidence of the conclusion. Therefore faith and belief on authority 
become co-extensive, and one cannot believe a conclusion known demon-
stratively.19 Donneaud concludes: “A direct consequence of this reduction-
ist interpretation consists in the impossibility for the Christian philosopher 
to continue to rely on the authority of revelation from the moment that he 
                                                 
18 G. EMERY, “La théologie trinitaire des Evidentiae contra Durandum de Durandellus”, in 
Revue Thomiste 97 (1997), 173-218, here 182-88. 
19 H. DONNEAUD, “Durand et Durandellus sur les rapports de la foi et de la science”, in 
Revue Thomiste 97 (1997), 157-72, here 163: “Or Durandellus confond lui aussi le plan des 
médiums et celui du résultat subjectif de la connaissance. Il est vrai que l’inévidence – le 
moins connu – ne peut pas produire l’évidence – le plus connu. Et une fois que l’évidence 
est là, l’inévidence, concernant ce même objet, ne peut que disparaître. S’ensuit-il que, dans 
l’ordre des médiums, la démonstration soit exclusive de l’autorité? L’incompossibilité de 
l’évidence et de l’inévidence, qualités de l’objet connu, entraîne-t-elle nécessairement celle 
de l’autorité et de la démonstration? Durandellus l’affirme sans le prouver. Nous verrons 
même qu’il contredit saint Thomas précisément sur ce point, faute de relever la différence 
entre l’ordre des médiums et celui de l’objet.” 
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knows demonstratively a revealed truth, such as the existence of God.”20 
Durandellus seems to have been aware of an objection like that of Don-
neaud, and in a passage that escaped Donneaud’s notice, he refers to “scien-
tific knowledge a posteriori, which perhaps is not incompatible with faith.”21 
To save his epistemology, Durandellus does not reconcile belief with demon-
stration but rather faith with scientific knowledge, conceding some type of 
scientific knowledge is compatible with faith, and that this knowledge is a 
posteriori. An example of such a posteriori demonstration is God’s unity. 
Traces of these innovations can be found in parts of William of 
                                                 
20 IDEM, Ibid., 170-71: “Dans sa réfutation de la thèse Durand sur la compatibilité de la 
science et de la foi, Durandellus s’en tient à la lettre de la thèse thomiste, en effet contraire. 
Croyant défendre saint Thomas, il outrepasse nettement les positions du maître. La raison de 
cette déformation nous a semblé résider dans l’ignorance tant de la raison formelle précise que 
saint Thomas attribue à la foi que, conséquemment, de la distinction entre l’ordre des médiums 
et celui de l’objet. Durandellus assigne indifféremment comme raison formelle à la foi tantôt 
l’inévidence, tantôt l’autorité. Il confond ces deux formalités, en bloquant l’au-torité sur 
l’inévidence et la démonstration sur l’évidence. Contrairement à saint Thomas, qui situe préci-
sément la raison formelle de la foi dans l’inévidence, Durandellus n’hésite pas à la placer 
également dans ce médium qu’est l’autorité: « Il est de la définition de la foi de donner assen-
timent à une conclusion en vertu de l’autorité de celui qui parle. » Parce qu’il semble ignorer la 
distinction entre les deux ordres, pourtant posée par saint Thomas lui-même, le disciple en 
vient quasiment à contredire le maître. Il affirme l’impossibilité du concours de ces deux mé-
diums que sont l’autorité et la démonstration au profit d’un unique assentiment: « Personne ne 
peut donner assentiment à une conclusion en vertu, simultanément, de l’autorité et de la dé-
monstration; non seulement à la cause de l’incompatibilité de deux actes d’intellection en un 
même intellect, mais aussi à cause d’une autre incompatibilité formelle: celle qui existe entre 
les deux actes, car la définition de l’un exclut celle de l’autre. » Saint Thomas pose pourtant 
une affirmation contraire: « le même homme peut connaître une même conclusion par un 
médium probable et par un médium démonstratif. » Dès cette époque, l’école thomiste n’évite 
donc pas certaines infidélités par rapport à sa source. Croyant défendre le maître, elle en vient à 
l’infléchir, par inattention aux nuances de sa pensée. Une conséquence directe de cette interpré-
tation réductrice consiste dans l’im-possibilité, pour le philosophe chrétien, de continuer à 
s’appuyer sur l’autorité de la révélation dès lors qu’il connaît démonstrativement une vérité 
révélée, comme l’existence de Dieu.” 
21 DURANDELLUS, Evidentiae III.32, ed. STELLA, 924: “Quod autem concludit quod scien-
tia quam habemus quod Deus est unus certior est fide qua credimus quod est trinus, dico 
quod comparando fidem tantum, quae habetur per auctoritatem divinam, ad scientiam hu-
manam, fides semper est certior eo modo quo dictum est. Sed comparando fidem, quae 
habetur per auctoritatem divinam, et scientiam humana ratione habitam – et hoc loquendo de 
scientia quae est a posteriori, quae forsitan fidei non repugnat –, comparando igitur ista duo 
ad fidem tantum, illud quod cognoscimus vel cui assentimus propter ista duo certius est 
quam illud cui assentimus propter alterum tantum, sicut est in exemplo posito. Fide enim 
simul et demonstratione a posteriori tenemus quod Deus est unus, sed solum fide tenemus 
quod est trinus. Secus autem esset, si sola fides ad scientiam humanam comparetur.” 
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Brienne’s commentary related to his principia on the Sentences, specifical-
ly when he criticizes his fellow bachelors. In his final principium, on Book 
III of the Sentences, he refers twice to a socius, that is, to another bachelor 
reading the Sentences the same year, who holds that relations are not differ-
ent from their foundation and terms.22 One of William’s colleagues held 
exactly the same view as Durandellus. 
William of Brienne also explicitly engages Durand of Aurillac on the 
question of the compatibility of scientific knowledge and faith. In his third 
lectio on the Sentences, William says that his socius, identified in the mar-
gin as Durand of Aurillac, argues against the compatibility of knowledge 
and faith, saying this that “theology is a science in us, but to us it is not a 
science, but faith.”23 Because the manuscript containing William of Bri-
enne’s testimony is the original reportatio,24 we can date his comment pre-
cisely: it appears in his third lecture, held at the earliest on 12 October 
1330, and in any case not much later. As a bachelor reading the Sentences, 
William of Brienne was expected to react to the principia of the other 
bachelors, held in sequence between 14 September and 9 October, starting 
with the Carmelite, possibly John Vogolon, and ending with the Domini-
can, Durand of Aurillac. Therefore, William’s comment is almost certainly 
directed at a statement made during Durand’s principium question. William 
then objects that his colleague contradicts himself elsewhere: 
But on the other hand, it is said first that his statement contradicts those 
that he says elsewhere. For he says that theology is cognition in us, but a 
cognition that is not through the cause. Against this: no cognition is scien-
tific knowledge properly speaking if it is not cognition through the cause; 
but theology in us is not such a cognition; therefore, etc. But this contra-
dicts his statements, because he says that there is no scientific cognition 
that does not receive the cause in being, but the minor premise is his own; 
                                                 
22 GUILELMUS DE BRENA, Principium in III Sent. (Praha, Národní Knihovna České Repub-
liky, Cod. VIII.F.14, f. 141r): “Oppositum: incarnatio-actio est relatio; sed nulla relatio est 
distincta res a fundamento et termino; ideo etc. Minor per unum socium hoc dicentem.”(f. 
142r): “Quantum ad secundum articulum, et dixit socius quod nulla relatio est res distincta a 
fundamento; sed ego dixi oppositum contradictoria(leg. contradictorie?) quod aliqua sit.” 
23 GUILELMUS DE BRENA, Lectio 3 (Praha, NKCR, Cod. VIII.F.14, f. 6v): Sed contra hoc 
dicit unus socius (in marg: Illa est opinio fratris Turandi, iam legentis sententias apud Predi-
catores), dicit quod theologia est scientia in nobis, sed non nobis; sed est nobis fides.” 
24 For a brief treatment of this manuscript and principia, see W. DUBA, “Rebuilding the 
Stemma: Understanding the Manuscript Tradition of Francis of Marchia’s Commentaries on 
Book II of the Sentences”, in Durand of Saint-Pourçain and his Sentences Commentary: 
Historical, Philosophical, and Theological Issues, ed. A. SPEER, F. RETUCCI, T. JESCHKE 
and G. GULDENTOPS (Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévale 9), Leuven 2014, 
119-69, here 140-47. 
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for if he says that theology is cognition through the cause, I argue to the 
contrary: where there is no cognition that is a priori on the part of reality, 
there is no deduction by the cause; but this is so in theology, therefore, etc. 
And even he concedes this.25 
William of Brienne attributes three doctrines to Durand of Aurillac: (1) 
theology is science in us, but faith to us; (2) scientific cognition is through 
the cause; (3) theology does not deduce from a prior cause to a posterior 
effect. From the context, Durand of Aurillac defended the first doctrine (1) 
in his first principium. He maintained at least one of the other two (2 or 3) 
“elsewhere,” alibi, and, since William is referring to alibi in the first week 
of class, that alibi must precede Durand’s Sentential year at Paris, which 
would match what we know about the Evidentiae. That scientific cognition 
occurs through the cause (2) could arguably be said to correspond with 
Durandellus’ statements that scientific knowledge is caused by demonstra-
tion; the concession that theology does not proceed from prior cause to 
posterior effect (3) matches Durandellus’ admission that theology is scien-
tific cognition a posteriori. 
Durandellus famously argued that scientific knowledge is based on evi-
dence and caused by demonstration in a such a way that it excludes faith based 
on inevidence and caused by authority. The always-hesitant identification of 
Durandellus with the bastard son of a Lombard nunnery has been based largely 
on authorities arguing from inevidence. The evidence, however, demonstrates 
for the most part that Durandellus was indeed Durand of Aurillac.26 
William O. DUBA (Nijmegen) 
Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 
w.duba@ftr.ru.nl 
Abstract: This notice answers two long-running questions of authorship. The first part of 
the notice addresses the famous question “Utrum Aristoteles sit salvatus” that survives in the 
manuscript Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 1012, a miscellany of primarily Francis-
                                                 
25 GUILELMUS DE BRENA, Lectio 3 (Praha, NKCR, Cod. VIII.F.14, f. 6v) “Sed contra dici-
tur primo quod suum dictum contradicit hiis que ille alibi dicit. Dicit enim quod theologia 
etc. \est notitia in nobis que tamen non est per causam/. Contra: Nulla notitia est scientia 
proprie dicta que non sit notitia per causam; sed theologia in nobis non est talis; ideo etc. 
Sed hoc contradicit dictis suis, quia dicit quod nulla cognicio scientifica est que non sit 
acceptiva cause in esse; sed minor est sua; si enim negat dicit quod est per causam, contra: 
ubi non est notitia \a priori/ ex natura rei, ibi non est deductio per causam; sed ita est in 
theologia; ideo etc. Et hoc etiam ipse concedit.” Corrections indicate adjustments to the text 
made after the lecture. 
26 I hope to explore these themes further in a forthcoming book on William of Brienne, 
tentatively titled The Forge of Scotism. 
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can texts. On the basis of contextual, textual and thematic parallels, the authorship of the 
question should be ascribed to Hugh of Neufchâteau, OFM (fl. 1310s). The second part 
considers the case of the Evidentiae contra Durandum, whose author, known as Durandel-
lus, Joseph Koch identified with a certain Nicolaus Medensis in 1927. A re-examination of 
Koch’s reasoning makes this attribution doubtful, and the witness of the original Reportatio 
of William of Brienne, OFM, shows that the Dominican theologian Durand of Aurillac is 
more likely the author of the Evidentiae. 
Keywords: Aristotle, Durand of Aurillac, Durandellus, Hell, Hugh of Neufchâtel, Thomas 
Aquinas, William of Brienne. 
